During the later stages of Maoism, nobody paid much attention to Taiwan. It was the mid-seventies, and while the outside world was curious about mysterious Red China, the military regime in Taipei was an afterthought. Other military governments at the time, like those in Turkey, Greece, and several Latin American countries, were closer to our eyes. But Mao’s China was something special and unknown, and it trumpeted a disruptive social experiment of which we only knew fragments. It was a nation in deep isolation. In those times, Beijing (can you believe it?) feared that Taiwan might invade China, start a war, and crush the revolution — the baby of the new social order Mao Zedong had launched against the whole world. If people visiting China were few, the folks going to Taiwan were even less. Taipei was good for scholars of Chinese, as it taught them better Mandarin than what we could learn on the mainland. When we were there learning Chinese, we had no chances to practice the language except when we traveled around China on cheap train tickets and tried to mingle with the folks capable of overcoming the shock of seeing a foreigner and having a normal conversation. However, in those times you could not go both ways. It was either the People’s Republic or Taiwan. There was no middle way.
The situation today is reversed and full of unexpected changes. The Taiwanese you encounter worldwide are no longer annoying propaganda teams trying to recruit just about anyone who was against China. On the other hand, once Red China started to open up and introduce economic reforms, the outside world believed that post-Mao China would become a part of the global community and that welfare and the market economy would bring democracy to that part of the world. Objectively, these were short-lived dreams, and perhaps thankfully, they did not occur. In 1996, after lifting martial law in 1987, Taiwan ran its first free elections. China’s reaction was to point hundreds of missiles across the Taiwan Strait. The crisis indicated a switch; instead of China, Taiwan had embraced democracy, while Beijing used fast economic growth to strengthen its military and economic power, stifling the seeds of democracy on Tiananmen in 1989. In 1996, in response to the Chinese missiles, America sent the Seventh Fleet into the area, and soon after the elections, the situation calmed down. But the posturing remained unchanged. China has turned into an authoritarian regime, selling its model as the most efficient and thriving society on the planet. And as much as Beijing claims the dispute between China and Taiwan is an internal affair, the conflict is also a consequence of the contradictions between authoritarian and democratic regimes. It is evident that the more Beijing shows its muscles, the more democratic Taiwan becomes.
However, as American President Joe Biden repeatedly declared that the dilemma of the present world is a choice between authoritarianism and democracy, the stand-off between China and Taiwan can no longer be considered an internal Chinese affair. No matter how strong Beijing asserts the national components of the crisis, the difference between the two societies proves different. After the civil war in 1949, the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan. They invaded a country that still had a certain number of indigenous people. With the growth of democracy on the island, the indigenous folks are getting an essential role in society. Therefore another aspect of the conflict is the following: Taiwan’s regime no longer reinforces the Sinification, while the Han identity is essential to the authority on the mainland. Taiwan’s situation is similar to that of Hong Kong before China took complete control over the city during the pandemic. Yet, the difference between Hong Kong and Taiwan is big. No legislation proves that Taiwan belongs to the community of Chinese provinces on the Mainland. Taiwan has its own defense system and is now helped by the U.S. There is no doubt that the only way to unite Taiwan and China is through peaceful methods, with negotiation and a people’s referendum.
On October 1st, the 72nd anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing sent 38 military aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The following day, Beijing broke its record again by sending 39 aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ. And then, on October 4th, it sent 56, shattering the daily record once more during a year in which China has flown military aircraft into the ADIZ on 173 days.
China appears to be rehearsing combat operations near Taiwan. It is also demonstrating its ability to conduct military operations against Taiwan at all hours, 365 days of the year. China is sending a clear message: Beijing is testing Washington, as it no longer needs to scare Taiwan; Beijing must know how ready the U.S. is to defend Taiwan. The U.S. has responded by engaging Taiwan, selling it more arms, and providing military advice. And yet, the Chinese invasion, though more plausible now than a few years ago, is not imminent. Instead, what creates danger is when an accident or a miscalculation turns deadly — a midair collision between Chinese and Taiwanese jets. This happened in the Hainan Island incident on April 1, 2001, when a United States Navy intelligence aircraft and a People’s Liberation Army fighter jet collided in midair. If a similar accident happened today, twenty years later, the consequences would be dire. But it is useless to speculate when China might attack or, as Beijing says, defend its national interest in Taiwan. We are in the hands of the politicians, generals, and intelligence agencies.
In early 2000, I was sitting with a friend in Beijing who knew a lot about Chinese security and with whom I enjoyed having political conversations. I kept no notes about these encounters, but I remember asking him whether he had heard of an incident in which the Chinese launched a couple of missiles that fell back to earth. My friend’s answer was concise: “Intel inside.” It was a great pun. Intel Inside is a slogan for one of the most important producers of semiconductors — the American Intel. I do not think my friend was referring directly to Intel microchips, but it was evident that he had a smart chip in mind. And since the Chinese were even more dependent on foreign chips 20 years ago than they are today, the implicit answer was that whoever sold the microchips to the Chinese did not want them to be used for the missiles.
In the last 30 years, China has made giant leaps forward in science, technology, economy, and military, to the extent that they have surpassed some of the progress that the U.S. and other developed countries have made. But China still lags behind in the production of semiconductors and that means everything today. From the fridges to watches, cars, and missiles, they all have intel inside.
The world produces more than one trillion chips every year. For decades, the U.S. has been a leader in the semiconductor industry, controlling 48 percent (or $193 billion) of the market share in terms of revenue as of 2020. Eight of the 15 largest semiconductor firms globally are in the U.S., with Intel ranking first in sales. China is a net importer of semiconductors, relying heavily on foreign manufacturers in the U.S. to enable most of its technology. Despite Chinese efforts to catch up with the other major producers, its attempts to manufacture chips are failing because it lacks access to the intellectual property required for the process.
Caught between these global superpowers is the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), a leading manufacturer in the industry, owning 51.5 percent of the foundry market and producing the most advanced chips globally (10 nanometers or smaller). TSMC supports both American and Chinese firms such as Apple, Qualcomm, Broadcom, and Xilinx. Until recently, the firm also supplied Huawei but it severed ties with the Chinese giant in May 2020 because of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s restrictions on Huawei suppliers over security concerns.
Some time ago, because of its high-tech semiconductor production, Taiwan was named the country with a “silicon shield.” It is said that what protects Taiwan against Chinese attacks is its role as a key supplier for the world’s digital economy. This should serve as a deterrent against potential Chinese aggression. Let’s see what happens.